

CRISIS NOTES

CRISES

1964

June 17 - July 17 1953

East German riots

July 1954 - March 1955

Taiwan Straits

June - Oct 1956

Polish riots, Gomulka goes

Oct - Nov 1956

Suez

Oct 23 - Nov 4 1956

Hungary

May? 1958

Lebanon

July - Oct 1958

Taiwan Straits

Nov 10, 27 - 1958 - 64

Berlin

(Khrushchev for Min meeting in 1959; Summit May 60;

K-JFK, Vienna, June 1961; Wall, Aug 61;

Sov interference in air access Feb - March 62;

rioting at Wall in Aug 62; Convoy

incidents of Oct - Nov 63; shooting of

two US aircraft over East Germany in spring 64)

May, 1960

U-2, Summit

Oct 1962

Cuba

Crises:

- 1) What sorts of measures — public, private — is SO likely to take to be deliberately reassuring?
- 2) to be deliberately confusing, or threatening, or misleading?
- 3) To what extent does SO give contradictory signals to different audiences? To what effect? How well does it gauge reaction?
- 4) What sorts of signals tend to be interpreted unwarily as deliberately communicative? How common?

(Distinguish: a) communication: receiver believes sender intends to inform, or influence opinion, & intends receiver to believe this.

b) inadvertent signal.

(Medical: sign & symptom?)

- 5) What sorts of attitudes, opinions "neutralize evidence": lead to discounting or ignoring potentially revealing evidence or basis for consensus; or, foregoing useful tests, observations? What attitudes "unduly alarm, detonators": Pearl Harbor, Munich, invasion of France, ... Berlin, Cuba

Crisis Studies

Try to find "real reasons" rather than
"possible reasons that would be (almost) sufficient
to explain choice" (i.e. which, if they applied at all,
would have reversed the prob of the choice: perhaps,
 $p > \frac{1}{2}$, or greater than competitors).

(Actually, these reasons may not have been
thought of, or supported, or were cancelled out
or outweighed or not believed; or, other reasons
may have been more salient

Key question: What was the choice; what were the alternatives
considered, supported

Interviews:

1. Sam: on Oct 17 "calculations"; Sam-Hilman role.
2. Warner: UK/OS/U-2. ME in 56.

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July 25 Terence Jackson, SR1

Paper on policy guidance to military commanders

Crimea

Civil War; telegraph; Grant and Charles A. Dana.

Spanish War; domestic political objections; the Ottos

in WWI; Robert Murphy in North Africa

Lucius Clay in Berlin.

In Crimea, telegraph was useful for sending info from front to govt, but, in opinion of commanders, proved an irresistible temptation to ~~Wash~~ London to ~~use~~ their authority to apply old experience to dominate the situation: give orders that were obviously inexpedient as seen from field.

[Grant, SR1 experience, Bay of Pigs.

Control of recon in Laos.

Dangers:

1. Telephone gives capability to control in "real time" (though tardily) in Washington; and responsibilities & concern virtually force Pres to do so, esp. if he has reason to believe delegation would be unsatisfactory.
2. Orders from "on high" will not be questioned as critically as orders from adjacent level of command (less influence, ^{less legitimacy} more danger, in criticism).
3. Local commander

'72?

VH- STALEMATE
MACHINE

see p. 176

b. 169 — Pres' "foater" intrusion
retrospectively, by pretending
optimism, ~~as a~~ adequacy — so
that when new crisis comes...

[e.g. CV after 1966, on budget]

then Phase B reinforces later intrusion of foolishness

Need to deal with counterfactuals:

Optimism is to be found:

- in Phase B: in operators (less in intell)
- for rejected alternative "A" (")
- in some mts, even in Phase A ^(Komer) ^(Rostow)
- expressed to public (West, McN)
- hopes for progress, "promise": not "success",
adequacy.
- perhaps in Pres, in A: hopes he will win.
even with his program
- in Pres, in Phase A:

belief he can win later, if he wants to
switch to currently-rejected approach

(pressure on him, + measure); or that

he or successor can lose later — i.e. that

there will be a better year to lose — or loss will
be inevitable, whether or not his fault.

S.M.: must recognize: intell ests

on GVN/ARVN/US/VC/NVA/DRV were right
(tho Pres didn't believe). (He gambled against them;

177 This, crises returned ^{sought S-r gains, with} lines; and but wrongly
(Pres' values + choices were not as bad as I ^{on future possibilities} suggested; but bad enough.) ^{to be different}
+ Pres ^{to be different}

Pres ~~to~~ knowingly chose moves ^{Hallam/Bell saw both.}
that were inadequate to the aims + expectations
he avowed; and knowingly concealed this;
then knowingly prepared up a later "crisis."

(But he did not determine later choices
in later crises, though he made choices
~~and to stay in~~ to just Withdraw
was to Withdraw more costly; thus, he
probably failed to foresee that a similar
choice would be made: that Withdrawal
would still seem intolerable, and Victory still
beyond reach, or too risky, & so he did not
"knowingly" choose Big Stalwarts.

That could be foreseen only by an observer
was (3) accepted intell. ests. (Pres didn't)

and (6) accepted S.M. model of Pres decisions.

wrt L-r axis

[Why did Pres take such extreme gambles? (4 lies?)
Because he focused on S-r, and his own stake - which he
identified with nation's;

If they had known: (2) still lots were right:
Nazi wouldn't break; no
way to win;

(3) S.M. machine: Next year
wouldn't be better: situation
again "serious but not
hopeless"; Pres would choose
again not to lose; & could
not, would not win...

[and sunday, - protection, right to what
mil. wanted]

Pres would continue to try with the
mountain...

Tomorrow would not be better; and Pres
would not be "better."

(Kk ~~to~~)

Would they have gotten out? Or desperately tried
to win? One fateful day done just the same, hoping
(Hilb).

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who denies the great "imperial glory."
But in Phase B's, the deal — that defines
their "ropes" : Hallen, JFK, me, all—

"that could be found"—

in ranks of Harvard ~~Boys~~ (JTM, WPB,
McN, Westy, JFK, McG B, (Hallsmith), Komer, Kodje
[Rust, Ball, Katznelson? Komer, Kodje
not Taylor? Nalty? Rostow? Forrester? Wilson?
Harrison? PPK? EGL; Yang?

+ CFR, Wall Str.,

S.M.

Roche (New Rochelle, July 12, 1971) says

CBV knew what had

S.M. (Stavins)

Kyp

Pres was ambivalent about "failure" in the mid-term, i.e. return of a crisis; because it brought him closer to point where he could Win, i.e. use winning means;

since (a) US involvement would be obviously greater

(b) There would be "no alternative"; challenge would be greater (e.g. NVA "mission" and alternatives would have been tried.

b.137

"Discrepancy" between what Pres
did and what advisors told him: concerned
only going Up — no one told him to get
Out (just, that doing so further to go
Up would mean a return of the crisis).

He may well have believed that to
go Up would lose in short-run:

— war with China, SO
or — collapse of GUN.

So he stayed in : but not calmly: desperate
signs of desperation: (a) costly, log-able gambles
(b) lying
(c) giving up L-R chance
for S-R stability.

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Difficulties with Fuller approach:

- Why did he believe? Not that...
- Why lie: discrepancy from public view?
- Why short-run?

Don-pol.

b. 146 - good dicton,

155 - Gille/DE

168 - DE in '65

how to lose

177 - What Pres' believed

Braford, 26 Feb 72


May - 76,463

~50,000/no for ~~Feb~~ - December

Nixon: over 3.2 MT since taking office
more than any man in history
(LBJ = 3.2)

Wright - A Study of War

Richardson - Statistics of Drunk



Moratorium Speech — Polissades

30 years war —

means 30 years of failure

to understand; to stay out;

to get out; to act; to stop

Failure of Moratorium. Welcome to band of failures.

DANO letter: intended to keep Nixon out; help
him avoid label of Nixon's War

Only way to get out — 1st year President,
blame it on me, on JFK-DBV officials who
were responsible — a door out of the war
that imprisons us all... For a Pres to allow his
prestige to become attached...

But Nixon picked up the standard....

But this is a failure of whole political
system. Also guilt — of all who fail to
do what they can

We are fighting for a gov.

What Nixon offers us is --- decreasing dying,
but killing on a scale that is not decreasing

Pat 3 April 1970³

Gelb Cawle, Britten; Moore;

Halperin

SEADAG

Barnuda

Every academic who speaks of war

"People should change the pattern of their lives;
take leave of absence;

The Locust War
like locusts, ^{American} ~~the~~ jets and helicopter gunships
now out now beyond the borders of SVN,
the 50 cal MGs + rockets chewing up finger
leaves, and thatched roofs ^{deaths,} and people, in
new lands.

The hunt...

CRISIS STUDY

~~VIETNAM 1970~~

Intervention + VN

TC-II

What circumstances give the US license to enter a country physically, exercise police powers ("Stop - or I'll shoot"), and kill citizens?
(Blackwell - 62)

NOT simply "concern" for the "consequences" with the country "if we don't"; "concern" for citizens' welfare or safety.

[Does failure to perform an illegitimate act have "consequences"?]

Does: invitation from that country's gov justify it?

Depends on nature of gov: representative, accepted (its independence (from us!))

Its legitimacy, for this purpose, is not certified by "country heads" - even in a democracy, other factors count for victory & stability. If it is opposed by an energetic, organized faction - one that could win, without our intervention - that compromises the legitimacy of our intervention based on "request."

But anyway: a "request" solicited
by us; by a gov totally dependent
on US support (even if we are equally
dependent.)

UNLESS:

↳ ~~ORANGE~~ BUT: VITAL US INTEREST —

where that is deflated from present,
Cold War notion, that any reason is good
enough to justify US intervention: and
that all interests are "vital", because they
are all interconnected, via:

- (a) Kremlin control; or later,
- (b) Kremlin/Peking benefit, from "loss to Blue,"
and from loss to
- (c) US prestige, human leadership + credibility
(essential to world, - fear of ("integrity of
unified Com effort). commitment)

This "nicety" about intervention would
not have seemed plausible 5 years ago.
But now we've seen what intervention
(against strong opposition) can do to a
country, and to ourselves.

We can still properly control our own legit.
interactions with a country: diplomatic, economic,
and, as member of UN and multilateral bodies.

(Note our concern for "Bloodbath" as early
as Sand's visit in 1966)

Why does Truth suffer so in war?

- Need for large-scale commitment : deeper
+ broader than can be achieved quickly by
truth, with its complexities + uncertainties, and
counter-evidence.

Hassler: 17 major features of "red gap" was
the mass perception of it as such.

(Compare attitudes to JFK & Nixon!)

Why? Media?

CB's personality?

CB's compulsion to lie is small rather?/

"What will grow from the strong rubble
of our belief in ourselves, in our saving
intentions and cleverness?"

Imagine: - US without obsessive anti-Com.
- With another foreign policy:
e.g. Sweden's

SFRC

- Implications of belief that VN was want peace.

(Problems of evidence)

Sawaglot

- From Van Van
- (T³ - Gradient)
- Lack of runoff
- anti-Con provision of Cost ; anti- "neutrality"

Falk?

- 1. ^{US} Support of Din, 1954-55.
2. Desire to see election postponed, 1954-55.
3. " " " " avoided, 1955-56.
4. its Kenya: 1961. And of "advisors"; ...
5. Din comp.

Tikai: "To say we are defending "self-determination"
in SVN is to add insult to injury for
Mexico";

but also for Americans: to tell them
that is why their sons have died.

[Senators' point: anti-Con, US interests
would be a reason: or, avoiding ~~Chap~~ Con takeover
or, ~~postponing~~ Con takeover

but S-T anti-Con (vs. l-r prospects)
is not, for public;

and US security is not at stake

(except for psych aspects of "loss")

What is main claim of GVN for US support?

That it will continue to "fight";

and (i.e.,) it will not negot, or ask us
to leave.

Themes

1. Needs support for: "establishing the ^{WRIT} unit of the central gov"; appointed officials; breaking sects;
2. "apathy, indifference" of the masses; "want to be left alone". (Our charter for not leaving them alone, instead ignoring their wishes).
3. US fear of "free election."
1954-56 : Ho wins
~ vs. Diem (vs. ARVN, Buddhists, Catholics, commun)
(coop. with US, MAAG)

class
negot
coalition
violation in admin
corrupt
non-pro-US
subversion

Chan / TF differs from Kim:

1. Does not expect VC to win a mile victory.
2. Does not expect US to "give up," go
any further. ^{negotia} [like Kim]
3. Does not want to wait for US to give up,
mandate fight. Wait cessation.
4. Desire for neutrality.
5. Buddhist rejection of dogmatism, repression.
C. " " " violence; hatred, terror,
polarization.

Even people ^{now} against our involvement may share
a wrong notion of the nature of war:

- (a) ^{silly} Com aggression } VN are united on Com,
(b) ^{silly} US intervention } or GVN side.

"all that count" — "all that
care" — not "apathetic,
indifferent."

The "Third group" is nonviolent — even when
militant.

A factor is SVN.

Tramble: TF (Third Force) label has
been attached (by EGC? Thorne?) to
alternative anti-Com leaderships (TMJH),
used to justify promise of the "right" of
US intervention.

(Critchfield? Chan?)

TF

Pro

- Evaluate in peaceful, political context, not war.
- No one "controls" ARVN, or will reform it.
- Reversion to militia?
- Could be more influential.

~~US~~ US can prevent.

And "ARVN can't control by itself" (without US backing)

- But in cities, refugees.

Con

- No match for NVA;
- Not likely to "control" ARVN, militarily, or reform it.

- ARVN may fall apart

- ARVN comp.

- Unable to unite.

- Unable to organize or act against US will.

- Failure ^{of leaders} to organize peasants.

Exhibits: to For Rel Comm

1. Ky memo
2. Y memo
3. Him statements.
4. (Chan on) Rep Gov
5. HCL memo: Mission Council
6. HCL on US need to stay in VN - even if asked to leave

(Note: our fear of "chaos"; naive; comp. with
Cons; being asked to leave; ceasefire; coalition)

See: On Buddhist

Hand - Lotus

Vo Van Ai

Must: Hassler

Mundelsohn

Lakey

Russell Johnson

Dirk

Jhi

Ozer: Monigari, David

Boston student.

Wumpf - U of Missouri

Race

CRISIS NOTES

Seems - lies

The need to believe lies, untruths —

because (a) truths are unpleasant ; or

(b) it would be hard to admit/reveal that one chose on the basis of those truths : that would reveal hard things about one's notions, etc.

Thus, to conceal that one is acting out of (a) corrupt notions (or, "political")

(b) fear, timidity

(c) influence of a given person.

(d) unknown notions (unconscious, impulse).

Thus, one "believes" rationales that give other reasons, answers, for choices.

An intention to lie is thus "willingness/desire of others to be lied to."

(e.g., "Ignorance is an excuse" - lies for inaction.
Highly-unk "never heard of my hair.")

Patent : "I do not want to" for "I can't."

(or "I can't" for "I don't want to - but don't know why.")

Thus, beliefs that imply "no choice," or
the action of outside forces, or "unforeseeable"
events (JFK, Cuban missiles) tend to
help evade responsibility; or, conceal motives.

K's hits to JFK

Thompson: say impossible.